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COMPREHENSIVE SCHEMES: THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT ALLOWS EMPLOYEES OF 
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO BYPASS 
TITLE VII AND BRING CLAIMS UNDER 
TITLE IX IN DOE v. MERCY CATHOLIC 
MEDICAL CENTER 
Abstract: Five of the U.S. Courts of Appeals are currently split as to whether 
employees bringing claims of sex-based employment discrimination are able to 
use either Title VII or Title IX of the Civil Rights Act as avenues of relief where 
both statutes are concurrently applicable. On March 3, 2017, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, became 
the most recent circuit to address this issue. Joining the First and Fourth Circuits, 
the Third Circuit held that the concurrent applicability of Title VII and Title IX 
did not preclude the plaintiff employee’s private causes of action under Title IX. 
This Comment argues that by ignoring Title VII’s administrative remedial 
schemes, the Third Circuit improperly circumvented congressionally imposed 
structures to make Title VII the primary avenue of relief for claims of employ-
ment discrimination. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a comprehensive framework to 
prohibit employment discrimination in the United States.1 In 1972, Congress 
passed the Higher Education Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, including 
Title IX, which prohibited discrimination based on sex in federally funded ed-
ucational programs.2 Although Title IX was enacted to combat discrimination 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012); Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (noting that the purpose of Title VII was to break 
down employment practices favoring particular groups to the permanent detriment of others). The 
prohibitions of Title VII are not limited to discrimination, but the statute also prohibits retaliation 
against employees that assert Title VII rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(3)(a) (noting that the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII prohibits discrimination in retaliation because an employee made a 
“charge, testified, assisted, or participated . . . in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title 
VII); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62, 64 (2006) (noting that the 
anti-retaliation provision attempts to protect an employee’s right to bring an action or enforcement 
under Title VII). 
 2 See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in 
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
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in the education setting, in 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court, in North Haven 
Board of Education v. Bell, held that employees were permitted to bring pri-
vate rights of action under Title IX to remedy employment discrimination.3 
Consequently, in bringing employment discrimination claims, plaintiffs were 
increasingly faced with the choice of bringing either Title VII or Title IX 
claims against educational employers.4 This choice has significant implications 
where plaintiffs are able to raise both claims concurrently.5 
To succeed on a claim under Title VII, plaintiffs must comply with the 
statute’s congressionally imposed administrative procedures.6 For example, 
plaintiffs must first file a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act transpires 
and then comply with the EEOC’s conciliation methods.7 If plaintiffs do not 
comply with these requirements, they will be precluded from bringing a suit 
under Title VII.8 In contrast, a claim under Title IX allows plaintiffs direct ac-
                                                                                                                           
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance.”). 
 3 See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 538–39 (1982) (upholding the validity of 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) regulations interpreting Title IX that prohib-
ited sex-based discrimination in employment by educational institutions that received federal funds); 
see also 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh explaining that the purpose of Title 
IX is to combat “corrosive and unjustified discrimination against women” in education). 
 4 See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (holding that a plaintiff, an 
employee of a federally-funded education program, can bring a claim of sex-based employment dis-
crimination under Title IX’s implied private cause of action); Bell, 456 U.S. at 538–39; Doe v. Mercy 
Catholic Med. Ctr. (Mercy II), 850 F.3d 545, 552, 562 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that a medical resident 
of a federally-funded education program can bring a claim of employment discrimination under Title 
IX rather than Title VII). 
 5 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 562 (holding that plaintiffs do have a right to choose to bring a Title 
IX claim when Title VII applies concurrently); Douglas P. Ruth, Title VII & Title IX = ?: Is Title IX 
the Exclusive Remedy for Employment Discrimination in the Educational Sector?, 5 CORNELL J.L. 
PUB. POL’Y 185, 197–98 (1996) (arguing that allowing claims under Title IX would enable plaintiffs 
to evade Title VII’s administrative requirements such as filing deadlines and conciliation procedures). 
 6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-5(f); see McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) 
(stating that in the “jurisprudence of administrative law,” the requirement that a plaintiff exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies is considered foundational); R. Wayne Walker, Title VII: Complaint and En-
forcement Procedures and Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. L. REV. 495, 495–96 (1966) (noting the statu-
tory procedures for enforcement of Title VII); see also Diane Heckman, The Entrenchment of the 
Glass Sneaker Ceiling: Excavating Forty-Five Years of Sex Discrimination Involving Educational 
Athletic Employment Based on Title VII, Title IX and the Equal Pay Act, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
429, 434 (2011) (noting that plaintiffs must determine whether the statute allows claims to be brought 
initially in court or whether they must first exhaust any administrative remedies). 
 7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (stating the time requirement for a plaintiff to file a claim with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)); id. § 2000e-5(b) (stating that the EEOC 
used methods of “conference, conciliation, and persuasion” to resolve claims). Conciliation is a pro-
cess similar to mediation or arbitration, in which a disinterested third party joins the parties to solve 
the dispute. Conciliation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 8 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-5(f); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 
50–51 (1938) (noting that a plaintiff is not entitled to judicial relief until he or she has pursued all 
required statutory administrative remedies); JACOB A. STEIN, ET AL., 5 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
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cess to the courthouse without the administrative burdens that accompany Title 
VII.9 In situations where a plaintiff has a potential claim under both Title VII 
and Title IX, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has a right to 
choose to bring a Title IX claim, thereby avoiding the administrative require-
ments under Title VII.10 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the re-
lationship between Title VII and Title IX, but recent cases appear to expand the 
rights of Title IX litigants by providing a private right of action for claims of 
employment discrimination based on sex.11 
In 2017, in Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center (“Mercy II”), the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed whether an employee of a 
federally-funded educational institution was precluded from using Title IX as 
an avenue of relief when Title VII and Title IX were concurrently applicable.12 
In Mercy II, the plaintiff, a female medical resident, did not file administrative 
claims with the EEOC pursuant to Title VII, and instead sought to litigate her 
claims entirely under Title IX.13 Even after the plaintiff failed to comply with 
the administrative requirements of Title VII, she nevertheless brought her 
claims against the defendant, Mercy Catholic Medical Center, under Title IX.14 
                                                                                                                           
§ 49.01, Lexis (database updated Dec. 2017) (stating that under the “doctrine of administrative ex-
haustion,” plaintiffs may not bring claims to court until all administrative remedies have been pur-
sued). 
 9 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (finding an implied private right of ac-
tion under Title IX); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012) (stating that the sole enforcement mechanism 
for Title IX violations is the revocation of federal funding). Title IX contains none of the administra-
tive remedial procedures of Title VII, namely the requirement of conciliation, time requirements, or 
deference to state agencies. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (requiring all departments and agencies that extend 
financial assistance to educational programs to create procedures to terminate funding for institutions 
not in compliance with Title IX); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), 2000e-5(f). 
 10 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 562–63 (holding that plaintiffs do have a right to choose to bring a 
Title IX claim when Title VII applies concurrently). But see Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 
857, 861–62 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VII’s “comprehensive statutory scheme” prevents 
private Title IX claims); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Title VII is 
the exclusive avenue of relief for sex-based employment discrimination claims in federally funded 
educational institutions). 
 11 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173 (holding that Title IX is “broadly worded” and its applicability 
extends beyond students to anyone bringing claims of sex discrimination); Bell, 456 U.S. at 521 (de-
termining that Title IX’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination applied to both employees and stu-
dents by a broad reading of “person” within the statute); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (determining that 
the statute provided a private cause of action even without express statutory authorization); Johnson v. 
Ry. Express Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (holding that a private sector employee is not 
prevented from pursuing remedial avenues other than Title VII but could maintain concurrent actions 
under Title VII and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act for claims of race discrimination). 
 12 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 560 (holding that “concurrent applicability” of Title VII and Title IX 
did not prevent the plaintiff from bringing sex-based employment discrimination claims under Title 
IX). 
 13 See id. at 552 (noting that the plaintiff stated that she failed to file a charge with the EEOC, but 
rather filed Title IX claims directly in district court). 
 14 See id. (noting that the plaintiff acknowledged her failure to file a claim under Title VII with 
the EEOC). 
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This Comment argues that the Third Circuit erred in holding that the plaintiff 
could circumvent the administrative remedial scheme of Title VII and bring 
her claim solely under Title IX.15 
Part I of this Comment reviews the statutory scheme and background of 
the Civil Rights Act, outlines the deference given to congressionally imposed 
remedial schemes, and explains the factual background and procedural history 
of Mercy II.16 Part II discusses the tests and standards that the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals have developed to address Title VII versus Title IX claims and exam-
ines the Third Circuit’s Mercy II decision.17 Finally, Part III concludes that in 
light of the exhaustive administrative remedial schemes of Title VII, the Third 
Circuit incorrectly held that when Title VII and Title IX are concurrently ap-
plicable, plaintiffs may bring claims solely under Title IX, thereby circumvent-
ing the administrative procedures of Title VII.18 
I. THE ORIGINS OF TITLE VII AND TITLE IX AND THE BACKGROUND  
OF THE MERCY II LITIGATION 
A. Title VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an em-
ployer to discriminate against any current or prospective employee on the basis 
of that individual’s “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”19 To ensure 
effective enforcement of the statute, Congress created the EEOC to administer 
Title VII.20 Along with creation of the EEOC, Congress implemented specific 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See id. at 562–63; see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144–45 (1992) (noting that 
under the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, claimants must pursue all administrative 
avenues prior to filing a claim in court). The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies serves 
the purpose of preventing judicial interference in the administrative process and allows agencies to 
apply their expertise without judicial interference. STEIN, supra note 8, § 49.01 
 16 See infra notes 19–44 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 45–97 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 98–124 and accompanying text. 
 19 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (stating it is unlawful for an employer to adversely impact or 
deprive an individual of employment opportunities for discriminatory purposes); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 
429–30 (noting that the purpose of Title VII was to break down employment practices favoring par-
ticular groups to the permanent detriment of others); Amelia M. Wirts, Discriminatory Intent and 
Implicit Bias: Title VII Liability for Unwitting Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV. 809, 812 (2017) (de-
scribing the two purposes of Title VII as eliminating work-place discrimination and creating equal 
opportunities for employment for all individuals). 
 20 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (delineating the structure and authority of the EEOC); Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (stating that the EEOC was created because congress 
intended employment discrimination claims to be settled primarily through means of “cooperation and 
voluntary compliance”); SUSAN M. OMILIAN & JEAN P. KAMP, 1 SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION § 12:1, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017) (listing the Title VII administrative re-
quirements that one must exhaust before bringing suit in federal District Court); Kim M. Cafaro et al., 
Employment Discrimination Law—Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools: State Employee Dis-
crimination Claims—Is the Conflict Between Title VII and Section 1983 Resolved?, 61 NOTRE DAME 
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administrative requirements that plaintiffs must exhaust prior to bringing an 
action under Title VII.21 For example, plaintiffs must file a claim with the 
EEOC no later than 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act transpires.22 
If, after a period of investigation, the EEOC finds reasonable grounds for the 
claim, it first seeks to dissipate the claim through means of “conference, con-
ciliation, and persuasion.”23 Only if these procedures fail does the EEOC in-
form the claimant of his or her right to bring a civil action in federal court.24 
Furthermore, if a plaintiff fails to meet these administrative requirements or 
chooses not to initiate an action at all, he or she is precluded from obtaining 
relief under Title VII.25 
B. Title IX 
Title IX, enacted as part of the Higher Education Amendments of 1972, 
makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person on the basis of sex in any 
“educational program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”26 Un-
like Title VII, the language of Title IX does not expressly provide for a private 
cause of action and does not contain the administrative requirements of meet-
                                                                                                                           
L. REV. 88, 89 (1986) (noting that EEOC authority includes reviewing claims of discrimination, pur-
suit of informal methods of conciliation, and bringing civil actions in federal court to enforce Title 
VII). 
 21 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (stating that plaintiffs must file charges with the EEOC within 
180 days of claimed discriminatory act); id. § 2000e-5(b) (stating that the EEOC must pursue unoffi-
cial methods of “conference, conciliation, and persuasion”). 
 22 See id. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (stating that claims must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the 
claimed discriminatory act). 
 23 See id. § 2000e-5(b) (stating that the EEOC must pursue unofficial methods of “conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion”). 
 24 See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (stating that where EEOC conciliation efforts fail, the EEOC must in-
form the claimant who then has ninety-days to bring a civil action in federal court); Cafaro et al., 
supra note 20, at 89 (noting that claimants must first satisfy Title VII’s administrative requirements 
before filing a claim in court). 
 25 See Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that for Title VII claims, the 
plaintiff is required to pursue all administrative remedies with the EEOC, or its state counterpart, 
before bringing a claim of employment discrimination in court); Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 
426 F.3d 1304, 1317 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that it is foundational that a plaintiff must pursue all the 
administrative remedies under Title VII prior to bringing a claim in federal court); OMILIAN & KAMP, 
supra note 20, § 12:1 (listing the statutory requirements under Title VII); see also Zipes v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding that the filing time requirement with the 
EEOC is similar to a statute of limitations). 
 26 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704 (stating that the purpose of Title IX is to 
protect individuals against use of federal funds to aid discrimination in educational institutions); 118 
CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh explaining purpose of Title IX was to combat 
“corrosive and unjustified discrimination against women” in education); Ruth, supra note 5, at 185 
(stating that Title IX was passed as part of the Education Amendments of 1972). 
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ing filing deadlines, deferring to comparable state agencies, or participating in 
informal conciliation procedures.27 
Under the statute, enforcement of Title IX requires all departments and 
agencies that extend federal funds to educational programs to create proce-
dures for ceasing those funds if an institution violates Title IX.28 Supreme 
Court cases interpreting Title IX, however, have expanded the statute’s ap-
plicability so that employees of federally-funded educational institutions can 
bring employment discrimination claims under an implied private cause of ac-
tion.29 Consequently, Title IX plaintiffs can file directly in court under private 
rights of action created by the Supreme Court.30 
C. Factual and Procedural History of Mercy II 
The plaintiff in Mercy II, Jane Doe, began a medical residency program 
with the defendant, Mercy Catholic Medical Center, in July 2011.31 The de-
fendant is a private teaching hospital associated with Drexel University’s Col-
lege of Medicine and accepts federal Medicare funding.32 The plaintiff claimed 
that during the course of her residency, Dr. James Roe subjected her to sexual 
harassment that included inappropriate comments, glances, and touching.33 
Despite the plaintiff’s many grievances about Roe’s behavior to the defend-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (stating that the sole mechanism for enforcement in the statute is ceasing 
federal funds where a violation of Title IX is found); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g), 2000e-5(e)(b) (ex-
pressly requiring meeting filing deadlines, deference to comparable state agencies, or informal concil-
iation procedures). 
 28 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (stating that the sole mechanism for enforcement in the statute is ceasing 
federal funds where a violation of Title IX is found). 
 29 See Bell, 456 U.S. at 521 (determining that Title IX’s “broad” language and prohibition of sex-
based discrimination applied to both employees and students by a broad reading of “person” within 
the statute); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (finding an individual private right of action under Title IX and 
not ruling on whether that right existed specifically for employment discrimination claims); Claudia S. 
Lewis, Note, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Harmonizing Its Restrictive Language with 
Its Broad Remedial Purpose, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1043, 1046 (1983) (noting that the language of 
Title IX provides restrictive remedies and comparing the Supreme Court’s “expansive[]” reading of 
the statute to broaden the remedial scope). A private right of action provides an individual right to 
bring a legal claim to court. Right of Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A presump-
tion against an implied right of action exists because where a statute precludes an act, a violation of 
that act does not implicitly create a private right of action. Id., Presumption Against Implied Right of 
Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 30 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (finding an implied private right of action under Title IX). Com-
pare 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (stating that the sole mechanism for enforcement in the statute is ceasing fed-
eral funds where a violation of Title IX is found), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(b) (noting that Title 
VII requires plaintiffs to initially file charges with the EEOC before bringing claims in court whereas 
Title IX does not contain such requirements). 
 31 Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. (Mercy I), 158 F. Supp. 3d 256, 258 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
 32 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 550 (noting that although Mercy is a private hospital, the hospital’s 
receipt of Medicare payments brings Mercy within Title IX as a federally-funded educational institu-
tion). 
 33 Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 258. 
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ant’s Human Resources Department, the defendant discharged the plaintiff 
from her residency on April 20, 2013.34 After an unsuccessful internal appeal 
hearing with the defendant’s Human Resources Department on April 24, 2013, 
the plaintiff decided not to file a further appeal.35 
On April 20, 2015, the plaintiff initiated a suit against the defendant in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.36 The plaintiff 
sought damages and equitable relief while also alleging three claims under 
Pennsylvania state law and the following three claims under Title IX: (1) retal-
iation, (2) quid pro quo, and (3) hostile environment.37 The plaintiff did not 
bring any claims under Title VII because she never filed a charge with the 
EEOC.38 Thus, the plaintiff did not exhaust the required administrative reme-
dies required under Title VII.39 
The district court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that Title IX 
does not apply to the defendant because the defendant’s residency program 
was not an “education program or activity” within the meaning of Title IX.40 
The district court further concluded that even if Title IX did apply, the plaintiff 
could not use Title IX to “circumvent” the administrative requirements of Title 
VII because Congress intended Title VII as the “exclusive avenue for relief” 
for employment discrimination.41 The plaintiff’s hostile environment claim 
was dismissed with prejudice as untimely.42 As no federal claims remained, 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 257–58. 
 37 Id. at 257. 
 38 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 552 (noting that the plaintiff acknowledged her failure to file a claim 
with the EEOC); Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (noting that plaintiff resigned from the residency 
program in 2013 and filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2015).  
 39 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-5(e) (listing filing employment discrimination charges 
with the EEOC as initial step to satisfy administrative remedial scheme under Title VII); Mercy II, 
850 F.3d at 552 (noting that the plaintiff acknowledged her failure to file a claim with the EEOC); 
Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (noting that plaintiff resigned from the residency program in 2013 and 
filed suit in federal court in 2015).  
 40 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 257, 259, 263 (referencing legislative 
history and principles of judicial restraint to narrowly interpret Title IX that the defendant’s medical 
residency program was not an “education program or activity”). The statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), 
states in pertinent part that: “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 41 See Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 261 (noting that some courts have held that even where sex-
based employment discrimination occurs in an educational institution, plaintiffs are still not allowed 
to circumvent the administrative scheme of Title VII by choosing to bring claims under Title IX). 
 42 Id. at 261, 263. The district court found that the plaintiff could not rely on a continuing viola-
tions theory to make a hostile environment claim. Id. at 262 (citing Mandel v. M & Q Packaging 
Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013)); see also Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167 (noting that to determine 
whether a continuing violation has occurred, courts must look to the breadth of the claimed discrimi-
natory incidents). 
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the district court denied supplemental juris-
diction over the plaintiff’s state law claims.43 Accordingly, the court dismissed 
the state claims without prejudice, and the plaintiff appealed.44 
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S DECISION AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Courts have been unable to reach a consensus on the issue of whether 
employees with the ability to bring sex-based employment discrimination 
claims under either Title VII or Title IX are precluded from exclusively using 
Title IX as an avenue of relief.45 Section A examines the reasoning underlying 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 2017 decision in Mercy II.46 
Section B discusses the circuit split on the issue.47 Section C discusses the four 
U.S. Supreme Court cases that the Mercy II court relied upon in its decision.48 
A. The Third Circuit’s Finding That Title VII’s Concurrent Applicability 
Does Not Preclude an Employee’s Private Causes of Action Under Title IX 
In Mercy II, the Third Circuit set out to address three issues: (1) whether 
the defendant was subject to Title IX; (2) whether the plaintiff could bring pri-
vate causes of action under Title IX; and (3) whether the plaintiff’s state law 
claims should be dismissed.49 First, the Mercy II court concluded that Title IX 
should apply only if the defendant’s “program or activity” had “educational 
characteristics.”50 Using a four-factor test, the court held that the defendant’s 
operation of the residency program satisfied Title IX because the program was 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2012) (stating that a district court may deny maintaining supple-
mental jurisdiction over a state claim for the following reasons: (1) the state claim “raises a novel or 
complex issue of State law”; (2) the state claim “substantially predominates over the claim” for which 
the court has original jurisdiction; (3) the court has already “dismissed all claims over which [the 
court] has original jurisdiction”; or (4) there are other “compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction”); 
Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 263 (noting that the federal claims had been dismissed from the case). 
 44 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 552; Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 263. 
 45 See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. (Mercy II), 850 F.3d 545, 560 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding 
that the plaintiff’s ability to bring a claim under either Title VII or Title IX did not prevent private 
causes of action for sex-based employment discrimination under Title IX). The Mercy II court’s deci-
sion was contrary to the holdings of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. See Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. 
Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 861–62 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VII’s “comprehensive statutory scheme” 
prevented the plaintiff’s Title IX claims); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753–54 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the plaintiff did not have the right to ignore Title VII’s administrative remedial proce-
dures by instead bringing a claim of sex-based employment discrimination under Title IX). 
46 See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 60–78 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra notes 79–97 and accompanying text. 
 49 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 552 (listing the three issues to be addressed). 
 50 See id. at 552, 556 (describing the standard the defendant must meet to be subject to claims 
brought under Title IX). 
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“affiliated” with Drexel Medicine.51 Based on this affiliation, the court found 
that the program was sufficiently educational under Title IX to be considered 
an educational program or activity.52 
Second, the court determined whether the plaintiff could bring private 
causes of action under Title IX.53 The Third Circuit agreed with the district court 
that it was conceivable that the plaintiff, as a medical resident, was the defend-
ant’s “employee.”54 The court further stated that the plaintiff could have filed a 
Title VII claim in court as an “employee” if she had conformed to the adminis-
trative requirements of Title VII.55 The defendant argued that because the plain-
tiff failed to bring her claims under Title VII, she should not be allowed to by-
pass Title VII’s administrative requirements by later bringing her claim under 
Title IX.56 Rejecting the defendant’s argument, the Third Circuit held that the 
applicability of both Title VII and Title IX did not preclude the plaintiff’s private 
causes of action under Title IX for both retaliation and quid pro quo harass-
ment.57 The Third Circuit made this determination by relying, in significant part, 
on four Supreme Court decisions: (1) Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Educa-
tion, (2) North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, (3) Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, and (4) Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.58 Finally, the Third 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See id. at 556–58 (listing the four-factor test). The Third Circuit reasoned that whether a pro-
gram or activity is “sufficiently educational” under Title IX is both a question of law and fact, and 
determined four “features” to support this analysis. Id. at 556. The four features included: (1) a pro-
gram that consists of either part-time or full-time study or training; (2) a program that enables partici-
pants to obtain a specific degree, diploma, or certification, qualify for an examination, or enables 
participants to seek a specific vocation or trade beyond an apprenticeship style program; (3) a program 
that uses “processes, examinations or grades” as evaluation tools, receives tuition payments, and “pro-
vides instructors”; or (4) the bodies “offering, accrediting, or regulating” the program regard it as 
having educational characteristics. See id.; O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(finding education programs typically provide instructors, evaluations, and offer a particular course of 
training.). 
 52 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 558 (holding that Mercy’s purpose was sufficient because it was “in 
part” educational under Title IX). The Third Circuit presumed, without holding, that Mercy received 
“Federal financial assistance” under Title IX. See id. (deciding to not consider whether Mercy re-
ceived “federal financial assistance” and remanding the issue for the District Court)  
 53 Id. at 559. 
 54 Id. (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992)) (relying on 
Darden’s common-law factors to determine that the plaintiff was an “employee” within the meaning 
of Title VII); see also Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (stating that the factors to determine whether one is 
an “employee” include but are not limited to whether the supervising entity maintains control of the 
party, the tax treatment of the “employee,” and the level of ability required for the position). 
 55 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 559–60 (affirming that the plaintiff could have filed a charge with the 
EEOC under Title VII because she was an “employee”). 
 56 Brief for Appellee at 6, 27, Mercy II, 850 F.3d 545 (No. 16-1247), 2016 WL 5345964, at *6, 27 
[hereinafter Mercy II Appellee’s Brief] (arguing that allowing an implied private right of action under 
Title IX for a medical resident at a private hospital would improperly alter Congress’s intent by cir-
cumventing Title VII’s congressionally imposed administrative remedial scheme). 
 57 Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 560. 
 58 Id. at 552–64. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171, 73–74 (2005) (al-
lowing plaintiff’s private Title IX sex-based employment retaliation claim under implied private right 
2018] Bypassing Title VII for Title IX in the Third Circuit 177 
Circuit held that the plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation and quid pro quo harassment 
claims survived, while her hostile environment claim was time-barred and re-
versed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims under state law.59 
B. Circuit Split  
In deciding Mercy II, the Third Circuit joined a circuit split among the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals on the issue of whether employees with the ability to 
bring sex-based employment discrimination claims under either Title VII or 
Title IX are precluded from solely using Title IX as an avenue of relief.60 The 
Third Circuit, holding that Title VII’s “concurrent applicability” does not pre-
vent a plaintiff from bringing claims under Title IX, followed the reasoning of 
the First and Fourth Circuits while explicitly differing from the Fifth and Sev-
enth Circuits.61 
The First and Fourth Circuits found that Title VII’s concurrent applicabil-
ity did not preclude a plaintiff’s private causes of action under Title IX.62 In the 
                                                                                                                           
of action set forth in Cannon); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (noting 
that Congress could have restricted the scope of “persons” in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) but did not choose 
to do so as a matter of policy; therefore, employees are not categorically excluded from its protection); 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (finding an implied private cause of action in Title 
IX); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (holding that private sector em-
ployee is not prevented from pursuing remedial avenues other than Title VII but could maintain con-
current actions under Title VII and § 1981 for claims of race discrimination). 
 59 Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 549, 566–67 (holding that the court could exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over the plaintiff’s related state law claims because the court maintained original federal jurisdic-
tion over the plaintiff’s Title IX claims); see Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. (Mercy I), 158 F. Supp. 
3d 256, 263 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (dismissing the plaintiff’s state law claims because the court rejected the 
Title IX claims that created original federal jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2012) (stat-
ing that a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction if it dismisses the claims that enable original 
jurisdiction). 
 60 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 560 (holding that the plaintiff’s ability to bring a claim under either 
Title VII or Title IX did not prevent private causes of action for sex-based employment discrimination 
under Title IX). The Mercy II court’s decision was contrary to the holdings of the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits. See Waid, 91 F.3d at 861–62 (holding that Title VII’s “comprehensive statutory scheme” 
prevented the plaintiff’s Title IX claims); Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753, 54 (holding that the plaintiff did not 
have the right to ignore Title VII’s administrative remedial procedures by instead bringing a claim of 
sex-based employment discrimination under Title IX). 
 61 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 560, 563 (holding that relief under Title IX for claims of sex-based 
employment discrimination is not limited to plaintiffs with no avenue of relief under Title VII); Pres-
ton v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll. (Preston II), 31 F.3d 203, 206–07 (4th Cir. 1994) (al-
lowing the plaintiff’s Title IX claim for sex-based employment discrimination to proceed by determin-
ing that those claims under Title IX should be interpreted under Title VII standards); Lipsett v. Univ. 
of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896–97 (1st Cir. 1988) (allowing the plaintiff’s Title IX sex-based employment 
discrimination claim to proceed). But see Waid, 91 F.3d at 861–62 (implying Congress’s intent to 
preclude Title IX as an avenue of relief due to Title VII’s “sufficiently comprehensive” remedial pro-
cedures); Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753 (holding that Title VII is the exclusive avenue for relief for claims of 
sex-based employment discrimination in federally funded educational institutions). 
 62 See Preston II, 31 F.3d 206–07 (allowing the plaintiff’s Title IX claim to proceed but ultimate-
ly deciding that her claim of discrimination under Title IX failed under Title VII standards); Lipsett, 
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First Circuit’s 1988 decision in Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, the plain-
tiff, while attending a residency training program, claimed sex-based discrimi-
nation against individuals and the University of Puerto Rico under § 1983 and 
Title IX.63 On appeal, the First Circuit found that the plaintiff was both a stu-
dent and employee and allowed the plaintiff’s sex-based discrimination claims 
to proceed under Title IX.64 Therefore, without explicitly addressing the issue, 
the First Circuit found by implication that the plaintiff was not prevented from 
bringing private causes of action under Title IX due to the concurrent applica-
bility of Title VII and Title IX.65 
Similarly, in the Fourth Circuit’s 1994 decision in Preston v. Virginia ex 
rel. New River Community College, the plaintiff, a counselor at New River 
Community College, alleged retaliatory employment discrimination under Ti-
tle VII and Title IX.66 The Fourth Circuit noted that although the Supreme 
Court had yet to address whether Title VII standards of employment discrimi-
nation apply to Title IX claims, a majority of courts faced with this issue had 
found that Title IX claims should adhere to Title VII principles.67 Following 
this rationale, the Fourth Circuit implicitly found that the plaintiff was not pre-
vented from bringing claims of sex-based employment discrimination under 
Title IX, even where Title VII concurrently applied.68 Thus, the First and 
Fourth Circuits have implicitly found that the concurrent applicability of Title 
                                                                                                                           
864 F.2d at 896–97 (allowing the plaintiff’s private Title IX claim to proceed by applying employ-
ment discrimination principles articulated under Title VII). 
 63 See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 884 (noting the plaintiff brought claims of sex-based discrimination 
under both § 1983 and Title IX). 
 64 See id. at 897 (citing Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Coll. & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 
316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987)) (examining EEOC guidelines and the legislative history of Title IX to de-
termine that Title VII principles should apply to the plaintiff’s Title IX claim for sex-based employ-
ment discrimination); see also Mabry, 813 F.2d at 316 n.6 (noting that Title VII is the “most appropri-
ate analogue” to determine the appropriate standard for claims of employment sex discrimination 
under Title IX). 
 65 See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897 (allowing the plaintiff’s private Title IX claim to proceed by apply-
ing employment discrimination principles articulated under Title VII). The court further stated that it 
did not make a finding regarding whether the defendant university was an “educational institution” 
that received “federal financial assistance” under the statute. See id. at 885 
 66 Preston II, 31 F.3d at 204, 205. The lower court held that it could not address the plaintiff’s 
Title VII claim because she did not pursue the required administrative procedures and failed to obtain 
a “Right to Sue” letter. Preston v. Commonwealth, 779 F. Supp. 45, 46 (W.D. Va. 1990). 
 67 See Preston II, 31 F.3d at 206–07 (listing the cases that found Title VII standards to be appli-
cable for claims of sex-based employment discrimination under Title IX and following that interpreta-
tion); see also Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832–33 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating 
that Title VII is “the most appropriate analogue” to determine standards of employment discrimination 
under Title IX); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 902 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that in Lipsett, the 
use of Title VII principles was “perhaps” allowable when applied to employment discrimination 
claims under Title IX); Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897 (allowing the plaintiff’s private Title IX claim to pro-
ceed by applying employment discrimination principles articulated under Title VII). 
 68 See Preston II, 31 F.3d at 208 (allowing the plaintiff’s Title IX claim to proceed but ultimately 
deciding that her claim of discrimination under Title IX failed under Title VII standards). 
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VII and Title IX does not prevent employees of federally funded educational 
institutions from bringing claims of sex-based employment discrimination un-
der either Title VII or Title IX.69 
In contrast, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held that Title VII’s con-
current applicability prevents plaintiffs’ private causes of action under Title IX 
for employment discrimination.70 In the Fifth Circuit’s 1995 decision in Lako-
ski v. James, the plaintiff, a university professor, claimed sex-based employ-
ment discrimination.71 The plaintiff did not comply with the administrative 
remedial scheme of Title VII but rather sought redress under Title IX and 
§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.72 The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff could 
not arbitrarily decide to evade Title VII’s remedial scheme.73 The court there-
fore held that Title VII was the sole avenue for relief for employees of federal-
ly-funded education institutions who sought to bring claims of sex-based em-
ployment discrimination.74  
In 1996, in Waid v. Merrill Area Public Schools, the Seventh Circuit noted 
that where different statutes, such as Title VII and Title IX, appear to enable 
“parallel paths” to redress a claim, the court must determine if Congress in-
tended either path to be the sole avenue of relief.75 In Waid, the court was per-
suaded that Congress’ decision to create Title VII’s comprehensive administra-
tive remedial scheme was implicit evidence of Congress’ intention that Title 
VII be the exclusive remedy for sex-based employment discrimination.76 Thus, 
both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits found that employees of federally funded 
educational institutions are prevented from bringing claims of employment 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See id. at 206–07 (allowing the plaintiff’s Title IX claim for sex-based employment discrimina-
tion to proceed by determining that those claims under Title IX should be interpreted under Title VII 
standards); Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897 (allowing the plaintiff’s private Title IX claim to proceed by ap-
plying employment discrimination principles articulated under Title VII). 
 70 See Waid, 91 F.3d at 861–62 (holding that Title VII’s “comprehensive statutory scheme” pre-
vents private Title IX employment discrimination claims); Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753 (holding that for 
claims of sex-based employment discrimination in federally funded educational institutions, Title VII 
is the sole avenue of relief). 
 71 Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 752. 
 72 See id. at 753 (implying that plaintiff did not file a charge with EEOC). 
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. at 753–54 (highlighting Congress’s creation of Title VII’s “carefully balanced remedial 
scheme” as evidence for the preclusion of Title IX as an avenue of relief). The Fifth Circuit in Lakoski 
narrowed its holding, that Title VII was the sole avenue for relief for claims of employment discrimi-
nation, to plaintiffs pursuing monetary damages under Title IX or § 1983. See id. at 753. 
 75 See Waid, 91 F.3d at 861 (noting that the existence of a “comprehensive statutory scheme” 
might evidence Congress’s intent to provide an exclusive avenue of relief under that statute); see also 
Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (noting that 
“sufficiently comprehensive” remedial procedures under a statute can evidence Congress’s intent to 
prevent a plaintiff’s cause of action under § 1983). 
 76 See Waid, 91 F.3d at 861–62 (holding that the plaintiff was precluded from pursuing Title IX as 
an avenue of relief for claims of sex-based employment discrimination due to the exclusivity of Title 
VII). 
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discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX.77 The courts reasoned that al-
lowing a plaintiff to bring claims of sex-based employment discrimination under 
Title IX would improperly evade Title VII’s administrative remedial scheme.”78 
C. Mercy II’s Reliance on Four Supreme Court Cases 
In this legal landscape, the Third Circuit in Mercy II faced the issue of 
whether Title IX’s implied private cause of action applied to the plaintiff’s re-
taliation, quid pro quo, and hostile environment claims.79 The defendant 
claimed that the district court correctly prevented the plaintiff from bringing 
claims of sex-based employment discrimination under Title IX.80 Pointing to 
Title VII’s “carefully-drawn” framework, the defendant argued that the plain-
tiff was precluded from evading Title VII’s elaborate administrative require-
ments by instead choosing to bring her claims under Title IX.81 Dismissing the 
majority of the defendant’s argument, the Third Circuit relied, in significant 
part, on four Supreme Court cases to support the holding that Title VII’s “con-
current applicability” did not preclude the plaintiff’s private causes of action 
under Title IX.82  
The first of these cases was the Court’s 1975 decision in Johnson v. Rail-
way Express Agency, Inc., which held that the scope of Title VII did not pre-
clude private-sector employees from choosing to bring claims under § 1981 for 
race discrimination in employment.83 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See id. at 861–62 (holding that Title VII’s “comprehensive statutory scheme” prevents private 
Title IX employment discrimination claims); Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753 (holding that for claims of sex-
based employment discrimination in federally funded educational institutions, Title VII is the sole 
avenue of relief). 
 78 See Waid, 91 F.3d at 862 (noting that Title VII’s administrative remedial scheme exclusively 
enabled protection of employee’s rights); Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753 (noting that it was unlikely Con-
gress created Title VII’s remedial scheme with the intention of allowing other statutes to evade its 
protections). 
 79 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 559 (reasoning that the Lakoski and Waid decisions of the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits were inapplicable because they were decided ten years before the Supreme Court’s 
2005 decision in Jackson). 
 80 See id. (referencing the defendant’s claim that the district court correctly found Title VII as the 
exclusive means for redressing a claim of sex-based employment discrimination in federally funded 
educational institutions); Mercy II Appellee’s Brief, supra note 56, at *6, 27 (stating that allowing an 
implied private right of action for claims brought under Title IX by an employee, specifically a resi-
dent at a hospital, would disturb Title VII’s administrative remedial scheme). 
 81 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 559 (noting the defendant’s argument that concurrent claims under 
Title VII and Title IX would improperly enable plaintiffs to “plead around” the administrative proce-
dures of Title VII). 
 82 Id. at 560, 562 (relying on the Supreme Court’s Jackson, Bell, Cannon, and Johnson decisions 
to delineate four principles that, when satisfied, allow an employee of a federally funded educational 
institution to bring claims of sex-based employment discrimination under Title IX as an appropriate 
avenue of relief). 
 83 See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459 (stating that Congress included in the legislative history that Title 
VII and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act are not meant to prevent access to one another); see also Alex-
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The second case was the Court’s 1979 decision, in Cannon v. University 
of Chicago, that held that an implied private right of action exists for individu-
als to enforce Title IX.84 After being rejected from admission to medical 
schools, the plaintiff in Cannon claimed sex-based discrimination under Title 
IX.85 The Supreme Court found that a private right of action existed under Ti-
tle IX, notwithstanding the fact that the statute did not provide a private right 
of action as a method of enforcement.86 
The third Supreme Court case relied on by the Mercy II court was the Su-
preme Court’s 1982 decision in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell that 
upheld agency regulations interpreting Title IX to extend to claims of sex-
based employment discrimination.87 The Court found that the agency correctly 
determined that the term “person” in Title IX included both employees and 
students within the category of people that the statute protected from sex-based 
discrimination.88 
Lastly, the Mercy II court relied on the 2005 decision, in  Jackson v. Bir-
mingham Board of Education, where the Court found that claims of sex-based 
employment retaliation could proceed under Title IX through an implied pri-
vate right of action set forth in Cannon.89 In Jackson, the school board fired a 
high school employee after he claimed that the girls’ basketball team had been 
subjected to disparate treatment based on sex.90 The Jackson Court reasoned 
that if entities receiving federal funds under Title IX were “permitted to retali-
ate freely” against parties, such as the employee in this case, those parties 
                                                                                                                           
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48–49 (1974) (stating that Title VII’s legislative history 
evidenced a congressional intent that plaintiffs should be able to choose their preferred statutory ave-
nue of enforcement, either under Title VII or other appropriate statutes). 
 84 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (holding that despite the fact the statute did not explicitly include a 
private right of action, the court implied a private right of action). Title IX provides one express en-
forcement mechanism—action through federal agencies to revoke funding—under 20 U.S.C. § 1682. 
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012). 
 85 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680. 
 86 See id. at 683, 688–89, 717 (noting that the four-part test developed by the Supreme Court in its 
1975 Cort v. Ash decision must be satisfied for a court to establish an implied private right of action in 
a statute). 
 87 See Bell, 456 U.S. at 514, 538 (upholding the validity of HEW regulations because they con-
formed to the nature of Title IX). Notably, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Powell, dissented, pointing to the entirety of Title VII’s administrative remedial scheme and the 
minimal likelihood that Congress would provide a redundant method of enforcement under Title IX 
that was not limited by similar administrative protections. See id. at 552–53 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(noting that Title VII and Title IX are governed by different governmental authorities that have dis-
tinct abilities to pursue specific statutory violations, means to address those violations, and distinct 
technical knowledge pertaining to the statute). 
 88 Id. at 516, 521 (Blackmun, J., majority). 
 89 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173–74 (holding that retaliation against a person for bringing a claim 
of sex discrimination is included in Title IX’s broad prohibition against intentional sex-based discrim-
ination). 
 90 Id. at 171–72. 
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would be chilled in the future from bringing claims of sex-based employment 
discrimination.91 
Based in significant part on these four Supreme Court cases, the Mercy II 
court derived four guiding principles to determine whether Title VII’s concur-
rent applicability precluded the plaintiff’s private causes of action under Title 
IX.92 First, Title VII is not the exclusive avenue of relief for claims of em-
ployment discrimination by employees in private workplaces.93 Second, Con-
gress’ use of “person” in Title IX represented a policy decision to allow em-
ployment discrimination claims to proceed under alternative statutes, rather 
than solely under Title VII.94 Third, under Title IX, the term “person[s]” covers 
both employees and students.95 Lastly, employees of federally-funded educa-
tional institutions can bring claims of sex-based employment discrimination 
under Title IX’s implied private right of action.96 Applying these four princi-
ples, the Third Circuit held that the applicability of both Title VII and Title IX 
did not preclude the plaintiff’s private causes of action under Title IX for both 
retaliation and quid pro quo harassment.97 
III. CIRCUMVENTING CONGRESS’ COMPREHENSIVE SCHEMES: THE ERRORS 
OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S DECISION TO ALLOW EMPLOYEES OF 
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO BYPASS TITLE VII BY  
BRINGING CLAIMS UNDER TITLE IX 
In its 2017 decision in Mercy II, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit incorrectly ruled that a plaintiff claiming sex-based employment dis-
crimination could bring private causes of action under Title IX in cases where 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See id. at 180 (noting that this chilling effect could potentially occur if individual claims of sex-
based employment retaliation were not protected under Title IX because employers could discharge 
employees who filed complaints without consequence). 
 92 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 560, 562 (listing Johnson, Cannon, Bell, and Jackson as four Su-
preme Court cases relied upon to develop the four guiding principles). 
 93 Id. (relying on Johnson to conclude that employees are not limited to using Title VII as an 
avenue of relief for claims of sex-based employment discrimination); see also Bell, 456 U.S. at 521 
(determining that Title IX’s “broad” language and prohibition of sex-based discrimination applied to 
both employees and students); Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459 (holding that employees are not restricted to 
Title VII as the sole statute to redress claims of employment discrimination). 
 94 Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 562 (finding the dissent in Bell to be unfounded due to the broad scope that 
Congress gave to the term “person” in Title IX); see also Bell, 456 U.S. at 535 n.26 (stating that the 
Court should defer to the policy judgments of Congress in determining the applicability of statutes). 
 95 Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 562; see Bell, 456 U.S. at 521 (noting that Congress could have restrained 
the applicability of “persons” in the statute but did not do so; therefore, employees can be subject to 
its protections). 
 96 Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 562; see Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173–74 (holding that retaliation against an 
individual for bringing a claim of sex discrimination is included in Title IX’s expansive protection 
against intentional sex-based discrimination). 
 97 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 560, 562 (applying the principles derived from Johnson, Cannon, 
Bell, and Jackson to the plaintiff’s claims). 
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both Title VII and Title IX apply.98 The Third Circuit erred in its decision for 
three reasons: (1) the holding is contrary to Congressional intent; (2) the court 
should have followed the reasoning and holding of the Fifth Circuit’s 1995 
decision in Lakoski v. James, which had very similar facts; and (3) the court 
incorrectly combined several prior U.S. Supreme Court holdings in order to 
support its conclusion.99 
A. Contravention of Congressional Intent 
Congress, by including exhaustive administrative remedial schemes for 
any claim brought under Title VII, intended Title VII to be the sole avenue of 
relief for sex-based employment discrimination claims.100 To prevail on a 
claim that Title IX is accessible as an avenue of relief for employees, the legis-
lative history and language of Title IX must indicate clear Congressional intent 
to create an avenue of relief in addition to Title VII.101 There is no such evi-
dence of intent.102 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938) (noting that a plaintiff 
must pursue all required statutory administrative remedies before filing a claim in court); see, e.g., 
Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that for Title VII claims, the plaintiff is 
required to pursue all administrative remedies with the EEOC or its state counterpart, before bringing 
a claim of employment discrimination in court); Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304, 
1317 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that it is foundational that a plaintiff must pursue all the required admin-
istrative procedures under Title VII prior to bringing a claim in federal court). Contra Doe v. Mercy 
Catholic Med. Ctr. (Mercy II), 850 F.3d 545, 560 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff could bring 
claims under either Title VII or Title IX where both statutes applied). 
 99 See infra notes 100–124 and accompanying text (examining three factors that negatively im-
pact the Third Circuit’s holding in Mercy II). 
 100 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-5(e) (2012) 
(listing administrative remedial procedures a plaintiff must satisfy to bring a claim under Title VII); 
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144–45 (1992) (noting that under the principle of “exhaustion,” 
claimants must pursue all administrative avenues before bringing a claim in court); see also Middle-
sex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (noting that the exist-
ence of “sufficiently comprehensive” remedial procedures in a statute can evidence congressional 
intent to prevent a plaintiff’s cause of action under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act); Hildebrand v. 
Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 20–
21) (stating that the presence of “sufficiently comprehensive” avenues of relief in a statute evidence 
Congress’ intent to prevent the use of alternative statutes to obtain relief). 
 101 See Ruth, supra note 5, at 209 (noting the Court’s shift from the test in Cannon to the use of 
congressional intent to ascertain whether an implied private right of action exists under a statute); Susan 
J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of 
Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 887 (1996) (stating that congressional intent to provide a private 
right of action can usually be found explicitly in the language of the statute or in the legislative history); 
see also Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that 
the “search for” Congress’s intent for a private cause of action is “unlikely to succeed” because the right 
was not expressly created by Congress but rather implied by the Court in prior cases). 
 102 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012) (stating that the sole mechanism for enforcement in the statute is 
ceasing federal funds where a violation of Title IX is found, and lacking any private right of action); 
Ruth, supra note 5, at 217 (noting that the limited legislative history supports a finding that Congress 
did not intend to allow any private right of action for employment discrimination under Title IX). But 
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The legislative history of Title IX does not provide clear evidence of 
Congressional intent to create a private right of action for employment dis-
crimination under Title IX.103 Rather, the Higher Education Amendments of 
1972 both enacted Title IX and repealed an exemption for education institu-
tions under Title VII.104 Intentionally subjecting educational institutions to Ti-
tle VII’s scheme demonstrated Congress’ intent to rectify gaps in Title VII, 
rather than to create a redundant avenue of relief under Title IX.105 
The language of Title IX does not provide clear evidence of Congressional 
intent to allow a private right of action for employment discrimination.106 Under 
Title IX, there is no explicit private right of action and the sole method of en-
forcement is an administrative procedure to withdraw federal funding from insti-
tutions in violation of the statute.107 In the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in 
Cannon v. University of Chicago Cannon, the Court found an implied private 
right of action in Title IX to enable a key purpose of the act: protecting individu-
als from educational discrimination.108 Title VII, in contrast, does not leave indi-
viduals without a remedy.109 The Third Circuit therefore improperly expanded 
Title IX’s implied private right of action to include employees because Title VII 
already provided employees with comprehensive avenues of relief.110 
                                                                                                                           
see Stabile, supra note 101, at 887–88 (noting that the failure to address existence of a private right of 
action cannot be used as evidence that Congress meant to entirely exclude private rights of action). 
 103 See Ruth, supra note 5, at 217 (noting the limited legislative history surrounding Title IX); 
Lewis, supra note 29, at 1050 (noting that the limited availability of Title IX legislative history is due 
to the act’s conception as a floor amendment, thereby producing no committee reports). 
 104 See Ruth, supra note 5, at 217 (stating that a key consequence of passing Title IX in conjunc-
tion with the Higher Education Amendments of 1972 was making educational institutions subject to 
the purview of Title VII). 
 105 See id. at 218–19 (inferring that if Congress wanted Title IX to include private claims of sex-
based employment discrimination, Congress would not have repealed the exemption for educational 
institutions under Title VII); see also 118 CONG. REC. 7563 (1972) (stating that the EEOC should only 
bring an action in court if conciliation fails); 117 CONG. REC. 31,960 (1971) (noting support for pri-
mary administrative enforcement of Title VII issues because of the familiarity and knowledge re-
quired in addressing intricate employment discrimination issues). 
 106 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (stating that the sole mechanism for enforcement in the statute is ceasing 
federal funds where a violation of Title IX is found); Ruth, supra note 5, at 211 (noting that the lan-
guage of Title IX provides no indication of congressional intent to allow a private cause of action). 
 107 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682. 
 108 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704–06 (1979) (finding an implied private right of 
action in Title IX because the sole enforcement mechanism within the statute, withdrawal of federal 
funds, did not provide an effective remedy for individuals). 
 109 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (stating that even where the EEOC decides not to sue, is unable 
to sue, or the claimant is unsatisfied with the outcome of the conciliation process, the claimant, after 
receiving notice from the EEOC, may file a suit within ninety days); Kim M. Cafaro et al., supra note 
20, at 89 (noting that individuals are allowed to bring private causes of action under Title VII after 
satisfaction of the statute’s administrative remedial scheme). 
 110 See Ruth, supra note 5, at 219 (noting it is unlikely Congress brought education institutions 
within the purview of Title VII to then permit evasion of its administrative schemes by recognizing 
claims under Title IX). Contra Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 560, 562. 
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The language and legislative history of Title IX do not provide clear evi-
dence of Congressional intent to create additional avenues to evade Title VII’s 
remedial scheme; thus, plaintiffs should not be able to bring their claims under 
Title IX.111 
B. The Third Circuit Should Have Followed the Fifth Circuit’s  
Reasoning and Holding in Lakoski 
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits correctly held that Title VII’s concurrent 
applicability prevented plaintiffs’ private causes of action under Title IX for 
employment discrimination.112 The Fifth Circuit case, Lakoski, most closely 
resembles the facts of Mercy II.113 The plaintiffs in both Lakoski and Mercy II 
claimed sex-based employment discrimination but did not file charges with the 
EEOC as required under Title VII’s administrative scheme.114 As recovery un-
der Title VII was prevented due to failure to comply with the statute’s adminis-
trative procedures and timeframe, the plaintiffs attempted to evade Title VII by 
bringing claims under Title IX directly in court.115 It is unlikely that Congress 
intended to create a bypass of Title VII’s remedial scheme by allowing plain-
tiffs to subsequently bring these claims instead under Title IX.116 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See Ruth, supra note 5, at 217 (noting that the limited legislative history supports a finding 
that Congress did not intend to allow any private right of action for employment discrimination under 
Title IX); Stabile, supra note 101, at 887 (stating that congressional intent to provide a private right of 
action can usually be found expressly in the language of the statute or in the legislative history). 
 112 See Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 861–62 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title 
VII’s “comprehensive statutory scheme” prevents private Title IX claims); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 
751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff did not have the right to ignore Title VII’s adminis-
trative remedial procedures by instead bringing a claim of sex-based employment discrimination un-
der Title IX). 
 113 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 549–50, 552 (stating that a medical resident, who worked in a hospi-
tal that accepted federal funds, claimed sex-based employment discrimination after reporting her supe-
rior’s advances); Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 752 (stating that a university professor claimed sex-based em-
ployment discrimination by her employer because she was denied tenure). 
 114 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (stating that plaintiffs must file charges with EEOC within 180 
days of claimed discriminatory act); id. § 2000e-5(b) (stating that EEOC must pursue unofficial meth-
ods of “conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”); Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 552; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 
753. 
 115 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 552; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753. 
 116 See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144–45 (stating that under the principle of “exhaustion,” claimants 
must pursue all administrative avenues prior to bringing a claim in court); Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 
453 U.S. at 20 (noting that the existence of “sufficiently comprehensive” remedial procedures in a 
statute can evidence congressional intent to prevent a plaintiff’s cause of action under § 1983 of the 
Civil Rights Act); Ruth, supra note 5, at 219 (reasoning that it is unlikely Congress brought education 
institutions within the purview of Title VII to then permit evasion of its administrative schemes by 
recognizing claims under Title IX). 
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C. The Third Circuit Incorrectly Combined Several Supreme Court 
Holdings to Support Its Conclusion 
The conflict between Title VII’s administrative remedial scheme and Title 
IX’s implied private right of action was not at issue in the Supreme Court cases 
Cannon, North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, and Jackson v. Birmingham 
Board of Education.117 In Cannon and Bell, neither of the plaintiffs had a claim 
under Title VII because the plaintiffs were not employees.118 In Jackson, the 
plaintiff was not the direct victim of sex-based discrimination and therefore 
likely did not have a claim under Title VII.119 Accordingly, these cases did not 
have to address whether employees bringing claims of sex-based employment 
discrimination are able to use either Title VII or Title IX as avenues of relief 
where both statutes are concurrently applicable.120 The Third Circuit weakly 
addressed this issue by stating that all individuals, including both employees 
and students, can bring discrimination claims under Title IX, whether or not 
Title VII applies.121 Here, the Third Circuit noted that discrimination claims 
under Title IX extend to all individuals, not merely those who do not have a 
right of action under Title VII.122 Despite the Supreme Court’s attempt to ex-
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 172 (2005) (noting that the plaintiff, a 
high school coach, was not the direct victim of sex-discrimination but complained on behalf of his 
students; thus, he likely did not have a remedy under Title VII). Notably, neither the claims in Cannon 
nor in Bell were brought by an employee. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 517 
(1982) (noting that the plaintiffs were federally funded public school boards); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 
680 (1979) (stating that the plaintiff was a prospective student applying to medical school); see also 
Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 455, 459 (1975) (holding that a private sector employee 
is not prevented from bringing claims of race-based employment discrimination under § 1981 of the 
Civil Rights Act due to the concurrent applicability of Title VII). The plaintiff in Johnson claimed 
employment discrimination based on race; therefore, the conflict between Title IX and Title VII for 
claims of sex-based employment discrimination in educational institutions was not at issue in John-
son. See 421 U.S. at 459 (holding that the scope of Title VII does not preclude private-sector employ-
ees from choosing to bring claims under § 1981 for race discrimination in employment). 
 118 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (stating it is unlawful for an employer to adversely impact or 
deprive an individual of employment opportunities for discriminatory purposes); Bell, 456 U.S. at 517 
(not discussing Title VII because it did not apply to the plaintiffs who were public school boards); 
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680 (not discussing Title VII because, as a prospective student, Title VII did not 
apply to the plaintiff). 
 119 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 172 (noting that the plaintiff, a high school coach, was not the direct 
victim of sex-discrimination but complained on behalf of his students; thus, he likely did not have a 
remedy under Title VII). 
 120 See id. (noting that the plaintiff likely did not have a remedy under Title VII); Bell, 456 U.S. at 
517 (not discussing Title VII because it did not apply to the public school board plaintiffs); Cannon, 
441 U.S. at 680 (not discussing Title VII because Title VII did not apply to the plaintiff—a prospec-
tive student). Contra Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 560 (holding that the plaintiff could bring claims under 
either Title VII or Title IX where both statutes applied). 
 121 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 563 (referencing Jackson to support the court’s statement that Title 
IX should be interpreted to include an expansive scope of individuals). 
 122 See id. (relying on Jackson for the proposition that Title IX should be interpreted to include an 
expansive scope of individuals). 
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pand the breadth of Title IX, Cannon, Bell, and Jackson do not combine to 
provide employees of federally-funded educational institutions with the choice 
to circumvent the administrative scheme of Title VII.123 In cases where Title 
VII and Title IX both apply, plaintiffs should not be able to evade Title VII’s 
remedial scheme by bringing claims of sex-based employment discrimination 
under Title IX; thus, the Third Circuit’s holding was incorrect.124 
CONCLUSION 
Although the trajectory of Supreme Court decisions has been to expand 
claimants’ rights under Title IX, Congress did not intend to supplant Title VII 
as the comprehensive employment discrimination statute. This intent is evi-
denced by Congress’ intentional inclusion of extensive remedial schemes in 
Title VII, the legislative history of Title IX, and the direct language of both 
statutes. Therefore, the Third Circuit’s holding in Mercy II was incorrect and 
should have been decided using the reasoning of the Fifth and Seventh Cir-
cuits. Accordingly, in cases where Title VII and Title IX are concurrently ap-
plicable, plaintiffs should not be able to circumvent Title VII’s remedial 
scheme by bringing claims of sex-based employment discrimination in federal-
ly-funded educational institutions under Title IX. 
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 123 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173 (reasoning that the language of Title IX requires a broad scope to 
cover anyone subjected to intentional sex discrimination); Bell, 456 U.S. at 520 (upholding the validi-
ty of HEW regulations that extended Title IX to claims of sex-based employment discrimination be-
cause they conformed to the nature of Title IX); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (holding that there is an 
individual private right of action under Title IX but remaining silent on whether the right existed spe-
cifically for employment discrimination claims); Ruth, supra note 5, at 217 (noting that the limited 
amount of legislative history supports a finding that Congress did not intend to allow any private right 
of action for employment discrimination under Title IX); see also Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459 (holding 
that a private sector employee is not prevented from pursuing remedial avenues other than Title VII 
when provided with alternative rights under § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act). 
 124 See Myers, 303 U.S. at 50–51 (noting that a plaintiff is not entitled to judicial relief until he or 
she has pursued all required statutory administrative remedies); Bonds, 629 F.3d at 379 (holding that 
plaintiff must pursue all administrative procedures required by Title VII before bringing a claim in 
court); Shikles, 426 F.3d at 1317 (noting that a plaintiff must first pursue all Title VII administrative 
requirements); Waid, 91 F.3d at 861–62 (holding that Title VII’s “comprehensive statutory scheme” 
prevents private Title IX claims); Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753 (holding that Congress intended Title VII to 
be the exclusive avenue for relief for plaintiffs claiming sex-based employment discrimination in 
federally funded educational institutions); Ruth, supra note 5, at 219 (reasoning that it is unlikely 
Congress brought education institutions within the purview of Title VII to then permit evasion of its 
administrative schemes by recognizing claims under Title IX). Contra Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 560, 562 
(relying on Jackson, Bell, Cannon, and Johnson to delineate four principles that, when satisfied, allow 
an employee of a federally funded educational institution to bring claims of sex-based employment 
discrimination under Title IX as an appropriate avenue of relief). 
